Hello, hi_octane, you wrote: _> it is Still very characteristic for people - "" any advantageous position to a clear victory. The good diplomat or the strategist can and stop when it is time. Here for example, memories of Klauzevitsa on final stages of war of 1812 when Russian already explicitly benefited: Russian rarely advanced Frenchmen though had for this purpose many opportunities; when also it was possible to them to outstrip the opponent, they it let out every time; in all fights Frenchmen remained winners; Russian gave the chance to them to carry out the impossible; but if we sum up it appears that the French army ceased to exist, and all campaign was completed by the full success of Russian except that they did not manage to take prisoner Napoleon and its nearest employees ... Kutuzov's strategy was that - not to achieve a solving victory, and simply to brake and exhaust Frenchmen while hunger, colds and illnesses do not destroy army lost-free Russian armies. Minimum of efforts and result maximum. Kutuzov a cyborg can was? (Though generally this version cannot be dismissed completely, under documentary certificates it was three times wounded in a head, two times from them it is heavy, and anything, safe and sound remained suspiciously) I once read so, but I do not remember where, it can and a lie that Kutuzov was against guiding of war with Napoleon outside of Russia, advising to Alexander to stop on boundary that further England and France fought among themselves. _> for comparing present that the USSR in the Great Patriotic War threw out German armies for boundaries of Poland, destroyed by bombing to Germans the key defensive enterprises and left from a battlefield. Without a taking of Berlin, without capitulation, and on the contrary left Germany and England possibility to pull out each other though to 1960, and Poland without any support from any side needed to turn only from the country to territory. For the USSR such it is impossible to present, and for the modern Russia? They could not, because there were serious fears that in this case the Western allies and Germany agree, reconcile, and in some years of the USSR receives the second phase of war from the recovered Germany, and that still can and with support to it from the former allies.