26

Re: Cryptography poker

FXS wrote:

https://dao.casino /

Both your post and a site - quintessence "mass ": a short hogwash not clearly about what and a heap of any internal activity, clear only the devoted.
P.S. The algorithm Description where to discover? In a mash of cross-references to a different obscure hogwash? To decant from short ?

27

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

the Question arose. Whether probably to implement gambling poker () so that it was possible to provide security blanket (clear business, cryptography) process of game from a juggling and ?

As a juggling and  - are not terms from area It - that they should make any determination.
I in the first have a thought that is necessary.
1) to Describe game rules
2) to Describe the protocol of interaction of the server and the client (it is admissible it JSON through a browser web socket)
And describe methods with which client can to operate.
3) Still  to reconsider methods and to throw out from all of them unnecessary or superfluous or
Leading to ambiguous action.
4) to Use secured random generator on the server for pack shuffle.
5) to Use protocols of type SSL for interaction with .
I think - Profit.
All remaining councils KMK will repeat normal recommendations about web safety.
. Regularly to watch broad gulls of actions. To eliminate type attacks man-in-the-middle.
But the principal point is (2) and (3). I think that they - key in info-safety questions
Applications. They are a zone of responsibility of the developer. All remaining - typical.

28

Re: Cryptography poker

mayton wrote:

As a juggling and  - are not terms from area It - that they should make any determination.

Well it is a question only of a technical aspect of a question of support of fair game. Certainly, players can unite, but it it should not give possibility to show a card of other players even if the owner of the server will participate in fraud.

mayton wrote:

I in the first have a thought that is necessary.

Well you speak already about implementation particulars, agree, it too is not unimportant and it is interesting. But now the general algorithm of protection first of all interests. We know as the symmetric and asymmetric enciphering, the cryptography signature works, he can be trusted a sufficient level.

mayton wrote:

But the principal point is (2) and (3). I think that they - key in info-safety questions
Applications. They are a zone of responsibility of the developer. All remaining - typical.

- What foot to cut, right or left?
- I think, it is necessary to provide sterility, tools should be sharp enough.
smile

29

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

players can unite, but it it should not give possibility to show a card of other players even if the owner of the server will participate in fraud.

As I already marked - the server has access to a pack so protection against manipulations on server side - is technically impossible.
It is possible to give to the server  a pack, but  it changes nothing - it is necessary to trust other participant.
P.S. That you so rush with "a trust exception" - any bank has technical possibility arbitrarily to change a state of accounts of clients, but, normally, there are no the basic problems to trust bank the large totals of money.

30

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

2. The player, receiving cards, requests at entrusted the sides individual keys and opens that to it came.

If keys for specific cards are requested, the information is opened for the entrusted side. I.e. any more the algorithm is a trust basis, and a certain side that breaks all concept.
If all keys enciphering becomes senseless are requested.

31

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

the Problem that the server which shuffles and hands over a pack, all the same has access to contents of this pack - there is no the basic difference between  algorithm and simple trust to "the fair server".

No, a problem in other. A key problem - it is necessary to eliminate cards already taken by everyone player from a pack so that it till the end of game was not known, which cards were are taken.

32

Re: Cryptography poker

ViPRos wrote:

helpers - generators, ,  etc.

are necessary to the server
smile))

33

Re: Cryptography poker

34

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

If keys for specific cards are requested, the information is opened for the entrusted side. I.e. any more the algorithm is a trust basis, and a certain side that breaks all concept.

Understand in what business...
Much easier to transit certification on absence of not declared possibilities () and certification of workplaces, rather than to try to represent operation in not entrusted environment. For a hamster or a small startup - the task very heavy, but it already their problems.
There are waste techniques of protection against exterior infringers and they are simple enough for implementation only means. Though and in these cases are required "not to write down all ruless of type passwords on leaflets", etc. organizational measures.
But here personally it is difficult to me to present protection against internal infringers without usage of organizational measures which remove technical actions on the second plan.

35

Re: Cryptography poker

Arises about such decision:
1. The server shuffles a pack, signs and sends the signature to all players.
2. Each player takes 2  cards, i.e. selects 2 indexes (n1, n2) from a series 0. 51 (in a pack of 52 cards), signs with salt the selected indexes, the signature on the server (salt while is saved in a secret) sends.
3. The server uncovers to players the content of all pack that disappears behind each index, each player checks the signature received earlier from the server.
4. Game process further follows:
5. The server selects  3 indexes for first 3 cards and informs on them to players, players already know that means each index.
6. There is a standard game to rates and so forth
7. The server selects 4th index for the calculation on desktop of 4th card.
8. The server selects 5th index for the calculation on desktop of 5th card.
The game end:
1. Players uncover to the server indexes of the cards + salt that the server was convinced of reliability for the account received before the signature from each player.
All like looks not bad, besides, that indexes can be intersected, and I do not see methods of it to avoid, without uncovering anybody the information ahead of time sad

36

Re: Cryptography poker

Tail. Give we come on the other hand.
You simulate possible attack. And we consider as it to eliminate.
it turns out here it is considered as to be protected from noise of electrons in a crystalline grid
Or solar storms.

37

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

But here personally it is difficult to me to present protection against internal infringers without usage of organizational measures which remove technical actions on the second plan.

Nobody speaks about absence of organizational measures smile

38

Re: Cryptography poker

mayton;
Well I told. The owner of the "entrusted" server enters arrangement to any of players, or with real players plays sent  from the owner of the server. I.e. any player receives mode GOD-mode, knows what cards at all players on hands.
It at all too most that some players enter arrangement with each other for increase of chances of a scoring - technically, they cannot learn a card from other players, only raise probability.
Me interests, whether it is possible to provide the protected game without resorting to the entrusted side. Because the entrusted side is and there is a critical vulnerability in all system.

39

Re: Cryptography poker

mayton wrote:

Ato turns out here is considered as to be protected from noise of electrons in a crystalline grid
Or solar storms.

Yes like here all it is obvious. All decisions while are reduced to the entrusted side. And the task just  is reduced how to avoid necessity for trust to any side, except trust to algorithm.

40

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

1. The server shuffles a pack, signs and sends the signature to all players.
2. Each player takes 2  cards

Already an error - the croupier hands over cards from  packs - any randomness.
If to select casual indexes the pack can and to be shuffled.
The second jamb - time the server shuffled a pack to it finite layout is known a priori.
Actually, in a real casino of the croupier plays a role of the entrusted side - differently the next player and would hand over cards.
Presence of the croupier allows:
1. To eliminate  from players;
2. Claims to distribution are shown to the specific participant of the circuit of game that strongly simplifies analysis of conflict situations.

41

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

If to select casual indexes the pack can and to be shuffled.

It is necessary to shuffle. As with known order of the cards, each player can select specific cards, imitating .

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

the Second jamb - time the server shuffled a pack to it finite layout is known a priori.

It is known. But it is not known that has been selected from a pack by each player.

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

Actually, in a real casino of the croupier plays a role of the entrusted side - differently the next player and would hand over cards.

In a real casino the role of the entrusted side is played by eyes of players. They see a pack turned by a shirt upwards. If you sometime see in any casino as the croupier distributes cards, getting them whence from under desktop, tell to me smile

42

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

mayton;
Well I told. The owner of the "entrusted" server enters arrangement to any of players, or with real players plays sent  from the owner of the server. I.e. any player receives mode GOD-mode, knows what cards at all players on hands.

It seems to me to us here it is necessary to put an end. To return on the beginning of a topic and to consider
Absolutely other subject.

43

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

And the task just  is reduced how to avoid necessity for trust to any side, except trust to algorithm.

There are no problems with algorithms - there is a problem with setting.
And setting turns out following: at the initial stage one of participants has the full information - how to make so that the participant forgot that is already known to it.

44

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

In a real casino the role of the entrusted side is played by eyes of players.

Eyes of players play an audit role.
The croupier - that the entrusted side.
P.S. In television translations of focuses of Arutjuna Akopjana my father noted its manipulations. It was not possible to me.
Hurt from me "the entrusted side" if I am not capable of trivial audit.

45

Re: Cryptography poker

mayton wrote:

it seems To me

Here with it it agree smile

46

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

There are no problems with algorithms - there is a problem with setting.
And setting turns out following: at the initial stage one of participants has the full information - how to make so that the participant forgot that is already known to it.

Well it too most, but in a profile.

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

Eyes of players play an audit role.
The croupier - that the entrusted side.

Playing online similar audit it is impossible. I admit that the task in view is impracticable without the entrusted side.
But before invented asymmetric enciphering too did not know, how it is possible to correspond, with which it is impossible to compromise. For protection from  men-in-middle the trust to the certificate that does not give possibility to the entrusted side to decrypt the message is required only.

47

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

It is necessary to shuffle. As with known order of the cards, each player can select specific cards, imitating .

If players cannot be trusted, it is impossible and to trust them a choice of cards. Moreover - the choice of cards the player directly breaks game rules.
Whether thus on the side of the entrusted server has no value of a card will be already selected sequentially from  packs or the server will casually select cards from the arranged sequence.
That the real croupier at first shuffles a pack - no more than the technical singularity connected to complexity of manual generation of casual sequence for once.

48

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

If players cannot be trusted, it is impossible and to trust them a choice of cards. Moreover - the choice of cards the player directly breaks game rules.

Well it simply part of algorithm, to game of the special relation has no, the essence does not change. As a result the player receives cards, which choice it influences to eliminate a juggling, and cannot select that he wants.

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

whether Thus on the side of the entrusted server has no value of a card will be already selected sequentially from  packs or the server will casually select cards from the arranged sequence.

Randomness should be arranged if someone one in one snout makes all decisions, all further manipulations are senseless.

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

that the real croupier at first shuffles a pack - no more than the technical singularity connected to complexity of manual generation of casual sequence for once.

If players took cards from the spread out fan, the game essence would not exchange on an iota.

49

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

playing online similar audit it is impossible. I admit that the task in view is impracticable without the entrusted side.

Actually online casinos also are such entrusted side. You either trust a casino or do not play it. It as a tail of burro Ia. [quote =] but before invented asymmetric enciphering too did not know, how it is possible to correspond, with which it is impossible to compromise.

I beg you. The invention of asymmetric ciphers in any way does not solve a trust problem.
And the infrastructure of certifying centers just assumes the aprioristic trust to some participants. PGP-shnaja the network of trust anything special does not differ from PKI.
P.S. System of signs "operation under control" invented before appearance of developed variants of machine enciphering.
Simply because struggle against misinformation is required without dependence from necessity of enciphering of the data.