51

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov;
I so understood, you absolutely do not have any ideas concerning the task in view decision, therefore you and undertook to convince me what the entrusted side it is good and so it is correct? smile

52

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

would Exchange - there is a conflict possibility between a choice of two and more players.
To eliminate conflicts between players - use arbitrators and arbitration rules.
Including - in the technician: any protocols of an exchange on the general bus contain arbitration mechanisms.

About possibility of the conflict I also speak, it is a key problem in the algorithm offered by me, and I do not know as it to solve. While smile
Someone can something offers.

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Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

I so understood, you absolutely do not have any ideas concerning the task in view decision

Ideas at me - as at that priest from a joke about dying hens.
Problem in that all ideas turn out as in Bulychyov's story "Eighteen times": "Where it to take an oyster - I can prompt, but where they take lemon juice?"

54

Re: Cryptography poker

There are 52 "slots", each player attributes to each slot some number, ciphers with some value of a key and publishes the 52 ciphered numbers. Let, for example, players 4 then in each slot lies on 4 ciphered numbers.
"The system" providing should be thus invented that from each 4 numbers one "was added" exactly unique "total number" (a card nominal).
Slots are a pack. If the player "took a card" (slot) remaining players give it the keys from this slot. And it, having an own (last) key, learns all numbers (concerning this slot) and "adds" from them "a card nominal", which at it on hands.
And when it "opens" this card declares all all keys so this nominal of this card all becomes obvious.

55

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

Ideas at me - as at that priest from a joke about dying hens.
Problem in that all ideas turn out as in Bulychyov's story "Eighteen times": "Where it to take an oyster - I can prompt, but where they take lemon juice?"

Could not  a joke about dying hens...

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Re: Cryptography poker

FXS wrote:

There are 52 "slots", each player attributes to each slot some number, ciphers with some value of a key and publishes the 52 ciphered numbers. Let, for example, players 4 then in each slot lies on 4 ciphered numbers.
"The system" providing should be thus invented that from each 4 numbers one "was added" exactly unique "total number" (a card nominal).
Slots are a pack. If the player "took a card" (slot) remaining players give it the keys from this slot. And it, having an own (last) key, learns all numbers (concerning this slot) and "adds" from them "a card nominal", which at it on hands.
And when it "opens" this card declares all all keys so this nominal of this card all becomes obvious.

With keys an invention interesting, itself I think round it, and already similar sentences were.
But I did not understand about "system", it is possible was more specific?

57

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

could not  a joke about dying hens...

the Peasant at whom hens die, asks the priest of council.
In some iterations receives recommendations of a different level of anecdotalism.
When the peasant ceases to ask new councils, the priest is interested - as affairs.
- hens, the father Died...
- It is a pity, at me more so much ideas were...

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Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt so I here too cannot invent this system (for the night ). Something of type of banal offset (on 52 unit)... But how to provide uniqueness of result (that nominals of different cards "did not stick together")?.

59

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

  - It is a pity, at me more so much ideas were...

smile))
Excellent joke, only hens here any do not die, the task is warm-up for mind

60

Re: Cryptography poker

FXS wrote:

hVostt so I here too cannot invent this system (for the night ). Something of type of banal offset (on 52 unit)... But how to provide uniqueness of result (that nominals of different cards "did not stick together")?.

To think for each slot such combination and that as a whole all dial-up represented unique sequence, it is necessary to know result of calculation of a combination that brings to nothing idea sad

61

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt;
The first contribution to the slot are the simply casually mixed numbers from 1 to 52.
Remaining - unique casual (for each contribution of each player to each slot) a vector of conversion, type:
If 1 that 45
If 2 that 26
...
If N that M
...
If 52 that 13.
Ha-ha, only.

62

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

it is passed...
)

... And what here not clear? Existence in any world of any object is equivalent to knowledge of this world of this object in all possible details. I.e., if the world does not know something about some object, most likely, this object does not exist (in this world). Quite comprehensible (including and for ) an axiom. (Accordingly, for any  games cannot be object about which something does not know "server", differently such object - off side)

63

Re: Cryptography poker

... Or not ha-ha. I went to sleep.

64

Re: Cryptography poker

I do not see a method to do without the entrusted node, but it is possible to try to carry out this node for limits of the game circuit.
The server  a pack, ciphers each card an individual key and gives to the following participant who arbitrarily reshuffles a pack and again ciphers each element an individual key. Well and so on on a chain.
In such circuit enough one diligent participant in a ring to eliminate swindle from all remaining - for decryption of the next card keys of all participants are required.
The entrusted node is required to identify participants and such node (surprise) there can be a certifying center.
P.S. By the way, such circuit also was, if I am not mistaken in that book which to me was laziness to search:-Q

65

Re: Cryptography poker

LR wrote:

Hm... And what here not clear? Existence in any world of any object is equivalent to knowledge of this world of this object in all possible details. I.e., if the world does not know something about some object, most likely, this object does not exist (in this world). Quite comprehensible (including and for ) an axiom. (Accordingly, for any  games cannot be object about which something does not know "server", differently such object - off side)

The server can be used for the scrambled correspondence and not to know the content .
Your theory does not work.

66

Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

the Server  a pack, ciphers each card an individual key and gives to the following participant who arbitrarily reshuffles a pack and again ciphers each element an individual key. Well and so on on a chain.
In such circuit enough one diligent participant in a ring to eliminate swindle from all remaining - for decryption of the next card keys of all participants are required.

If each following participant reshuffles a pack how then to request keys of all participants? Any constant identifier for each position is necessary. And the identifier brings to nothing a shuffle.
But as a whole, pack enciphering by each of the participant on-turn with the subsequent request of keys at each of participants looks very similar to the required decision.

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

the Entrusted node is required to identify participants and such node (surprise) there can be a certifying center.

It satisfies to the statements of the problem, the certifying center identifies participants, and thus has no full knowledge of a game situation.

67

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

If each following participant reshuffles a pack how then to request keys of all participants?

It is just trivial enough - in the circuit without the entrusted center audit of results all the same is required.
I lowered quite trivial things, fuller circuit looks so:
Prior to the beginning of game all participants work out the necessary number of individual encrypting keys, sign all chain and send (only the signature) on the server. The server publishes all packet assured by own signature.
The server generates initial , ciphers each element an individual key and publishes (only) a digital signature of initial allocation.
Each of players signs the data published by the server and sends them reversely on the server. The server signs and publishes all data package.
By this moment at us is:
1. A dial-up of individual encrypting keys at each participant. Usage correctness each participant of the data from a dial-up it will be possible to check up a post factum;
2. A digital signature initial  which saw all participants.
The server sends to the first player the signed encryption of initial arrangement. The player shuffles a pack, ciphers each element of new sequence the key set and sends to the following player the signed pair " data retrieveds - the ".
It is absolutely optional to player to do difficult shuffling: ring shift suffices - classical "to remove and change in places".
After the game termination everything is published that "was on hands": the opened sequences of individual encrypting keys allow any player to check up a correctness of all steps of shuffle irrespective of remaining, and digital signatures allow to make sure of authorship of action and, at technical possibility - in time of its fulfillment.

68

Re: Cryptography poker

Is not present - a hogwash invented.
As soon as we rearranged cards - it is not known what key to use for decryption of the next element.

69

Re: Cryptography poker

In general, whatever one may do - and the server should be the entrusted element.
Easier because to trust players - is even worse:-Q

70

Re: Cryptography poker

In general, without an estimation of cryptography firmness, such variant turns out.
The server generates long gamma (the number of cards increased by double-fourfold key size of enciphering).
The server generates initial sequence of cards, adds in zero bits to double-fourfold key size of enciphering, gets mixed up with gamma on eliminating and independently ciphers each unit. If I am not mistaken, it CBC (a mode ).
The extension of digit capacity and mixing with gamma becomes to avoid selection for the dictionary.
The player who has received scrambled sequence, reshuffles it (the enciphering mode allows), ciphers result the key and sends to the following participant on a circle.
The circuit eliminates swindle at presence at least one diligent player, but demands a shuffle residual a pack on each round: at least one participant receives all keys and can decrypt all pack.
The circuit of audit of game, as a whole, is saved also special reviewing does not demand.

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Re: Cryptography poker

Basil A. Sidorov wrote:

at least one participant receives all keys and can decrypt all pack

... That gives up as a bad job the circuit without the entrusted center.

72

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt;
It is possible!))

73

Re: Cryptography poker

Players can enter arrangement with each other and discredit casino online.

74

Re: Cryptography poker

prompts that the decision is, but, probably, each of players should generate ~ 52! (Factorial)

75

Re: Cryptography poker

hVostt wrote:

it is passed...
smile))

Even in children's fairy tales a card cut on some parts and deposited in different storage
Servers should be a little - at everyone the responsibility and the knowledge